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Abstract A seminal policy year for development and
sustainability occurs in 2015 due to three parallel processes
that seek long-term agreements for climate change, the
Sustainable Development Goals, and disaster risk reduction.
Little reason exists to separate them, since all three examine
and aim to deal with many similar processes, including
vulnerability and resilience. This article uses vulnerability
and resilience to explore the intersections and overlaps
amongst climate change, disaster risk reduction, and sus-
tainability. Critiquing concepts such as ‘‘return to normal’’
and ‘‘double exposure’’ demonstrate how separating climate
change from wider contexts is counterproductive. Climate
change is one contributor to disaster risk and one creeping
environmental change amongst many, and not necessarily
the most prominent or fundamental contributor. Yet climate
change has become politically important, yielding an op-
portunity to highlight and tackle the deep-rooted vul-
nerability processes that cause ‘‘multiple exposure’’ to
multiple threats. To enhance resilience processes that deal
with the challenges, a prudent place for climate change
would be as a subset within disaster risk reduction. Climate
change adaptation therefore becomes one of many processes
within disaster risk reduction. In turn, disaster risk reduction
should sit within development and sustainability to avoid
isolation from topics wider than disaster risk. Integration of
the topics in this way moves beyond expressions of vul-
nerability and resilience towards a vision of disaster risk
reduction’s future that ends tribalism and separation in order
to work together to achieve common goals for humanity.
Keywords Adaptation  Climate change  Disaster risk
reduction  Mitigation  Resilience  Vulnerability
1 Common Goals and Interests: Beyond ‘‘Normal’’
Humanity has created numerous challenges for Planet Earth
and, consequently, for ourselves. A seminal policy year for
environment and development takes place in 2015 due to three
parallel but interacting United Nations processes: (1) seeking a
long-term agreement on dealing with greenhouse gases and
climate change impacts; (2) aiming for the finalization and
adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals; and (3)
striving to develop a successor to the Hyogo Framework for
Action as a global disaster risk reduction plan.
Why three separate processes? Why not join them? They
all have common themes, use common approaches, and
deal with common terms, including the examples of
‘‘vulnerability’’ and ‘‘resilience.’’ In theory, there should be
no need to separate them, but instead to use 2015 as an
opportunity to bring them together and to learn from each
other in order to improve society and build a better future.
The point of these processes is to create something new,
beyond the normal situation of poor development, poverty,
vulnerability, and disaster.
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Seeking something new, rather than perpetuating the
normal, seems to be at odds with many conceptualizations
of ‘‘resilience’’ in which the core idea is to return to
‘‘normal’’ or, after a disaster, to return to the pre-disaster
state. Yet returning to normal means returning to poor
development, poverty, vulnerability, and disaster, not
building a better future. As one example from among
many, with a heavy basis in ecosystem science, the Re-
silience Alliance (epitomized by Folke 2006) states that
resilience is about ‘‘still hav[ing] the same identity (re-
tain[ing] the same basic structure and ways of function-
ing).’’ No explanation is given for why it should
necessarily be an objective to retain the same identity,
structure, and ways of functioning. Conversely, overcom-
ing racial segregation and giving women equal rights is
based on overturning the standard functions and controls of
society; that is, permitting a disturbance to fundamentally
change a system.
In fact, the assumption that society has a ‘‘normal’’ state
could be questioned, since society always changes. Is so-
ciety ever on an even, steady trajectory that could be called
‘‘stable,’’ ‘‘usual,’’ or ‘‘normal’’ over the long-term? The
assumption that society would not wish to, or should not,
change is questionable, because there are fundamental
aspects of society’s controls, functions, and processes that
have changed in the past—such as excluding people on the
basis of gender and race—and that should change in the
future—such as continuing sexism and racism. How these
changes may be enacted should be discussed in order to
avoid accusations of external imposition for societal
change and cultural imperialism, if it is desired to avoid
such accusations.
Glantz and Jamieson (2000) and Tobin (1999) note that
if resilience involves a return to pre-disaster conditions,
then it is simply a return to the conditions, including vul-
nerability, which led to a disaster in the first place. Vul-
nerability is the chronic, ‘‘normal’’ condition related to
poor development and sustainability practices (Hewitt
1983; Lewis 1999; Wisner et al. 2004, 2012). Should a
desire exist to return to that ‘‘normal’’ of the vulnerability
process? That would be setting up another disaster. If post-
earthquake Haiti rebuilt to its status prior to the 2010 dis-
aster, then the country is deliberately constructing the
conditions which killed over 200,000 people in the first
place.
Furthermore, survivors carry a disaster with them for
life, through emotions and reactions. An example is flood
survivors feeling stressed when it rains (Tapsell et al.
2002). ‘‘Recovery’’ can be achieved through continuing
with life without letting the flood experience control all
decisions—an appropriate development approach. But the
experience of being flooded might never, and perhaps
never should, go away and be forgotten as if it never
happened. Instead, hazards can be ‘‘normalized’’ through
response mechanisms that are fully embedded within
people’s everyday life (Anderson 1968; Bankoff 2003).
‘‘Return to normal’’ might never be feasible after a disaster
(Fordham 1998; Hills 1998)—and it might never be de-
sirable. Rather than ‘‘bouncing back,’’ resilience and sus-
tainability could instead be demonstrated through a society
that does not get ‘‘back to normal,’’ but instead does better,
even through ‘‘bouncing forward’’ (Manyena et al. 2011).
The post-disaster development paradigm of ‘‘Build Back
Better’’ personifies that perspective, within the critiques of
that term and process (Kennedy et al. 2008).
The three 2015 processes have an opportunity to em-
brace, promote, and make practical these notions, including
using vulnerability and resilience concepts that would
break out of the trajectories leading to disasters and sus-
tainability difficulties. Applying long-term, deeper per-
spectives seeks a ‘‘normal’’ in which hazard effects,
including those from climate change, are less detrimental
and more advantageous for society. Part of this strategy
entails deepening our approach to vulnerability and re-
silience in order to step beyond standard approaches that
have proven counterproductive to the common 2015 goals.
2 Deepening Our Approach to Vulnerability
and Resilience
To facilitate improvement and integration, five points are
suggested here because they embrace wider and deeper
meanings that ensure a robust future for disaster risk re-
duction. These points are presented a priori but emerge
from a long history of research, policy, and practice for
which only a few example citations were given in the
previous section.
(1) Vulnerability and resilience are dominated by quan-
titative approaches, even though they are also
qualitative. Not all aspects of vulnerability and re-
silience can be demonstrated by calculation or quan-
tification, even where these actions assist with some
aspects. Qualitative characteristics are shown by the
value of intangible items, including photographs and
archaeological sites, in understanding how people and
communities avoid, react to, and recover from dis-
asters (Parker et al. 2007).
(2) Vulnerability and resilience are presented as being
objective, when subjectivity is more realistic. For
example, Russia has been saved at least three times
from invading armies when the harsh winter weather,
coupled with poor strategic military decisions by the
invader and solid tactics from the Russians, con-
tributed to the invaders’ defeat. The invasions were
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by Charles XII of Sweden from 1708 to 1709,
Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of 1812, and Adolf
Hitler from 1941 to 1943. Similarly, the victory of the
English navy in the Camperdown Campaign in 1797
has been attributed as much to weather as to military
tactics (Wheeler 1991). In such cases, one side in a
military conflict saw weather damage as vulnerability,
while the other saw it as resilience. The perspective
depended on to whom the damage was being done. A
parallel interpretation is that the environmental phe-
nomena itself can be a hazard or a resource/oppor-
tunity, depending on one’s perspective. If it is viewed
as a hazard, then vulnerability is emphasized. Con-
versely, if it is viewed as a resource or opportunity,
then resilience is emphasized. In this way, environ-
mental phenomena can be intertwined with the
interpretation conferred on it by society.
(3) Vulnerability and resilience are assumed to have
absolute metrics, but proportional approaches are
important too. Lewis (1979, 1999), amongst others,
provides an alternative to the frequent focus on
presenting absolute numbers to describe vulnerability
and resilience. He describes why proportional impact,
indicative of proportional vulnerability, provides
important information for development activities.
For instance, islands have small populations relative
to cities. Even if 100 % of an island country’s
population is affected by a poor water supply or by a
cyclone, that situation is unlikely to match the
numbers of people who would be affected in a
megacity with only 1 % of the population affected.
Yet 100 % of a population affected can be much
worse than 1 % of a population affected. Absolute
and proportional metrics provide different character-
istics of vulnerability and resilience, so both are
needed.
(4) Vulnerability and resilience are assumed to be non-
contextual, when contextuality or localization tends to
be more realistic. Often, a method for quantifying
objective vulnerability or resilience is assumed to be
transferable to other contexts. That assumption might
not be appropriate. Vulnerability and resilience might
be predominantly Western constructs that makes their
understanding and application highly contextual (see
also Bankoff 2001; Baldacchino 2004). In fact, some
languages do not have words for ‘‘vulnerability’’ or
‘‘resilience’’ and the concepts can be difficult to
explain within those cultural contexts.
(5) Vulnerability and resilience are often presented as
being the current state, whereas examining a long-
term process with a past and future is needed.
Vulnerability and resilience are not only about the
present state, but are also about what society has done
to itself (and especially what some sectors have done
to other sectors) over the long-term; why and how
society has taken that set of actions in order to reach
the present state; and how society might change the
present state to improve in the future (see also Lewis
1999; Bankoff 2001; Garcia-Acosta 2004; Wisner
et al. 2004, 2012).
These five points show how varying perspectives and
wider contexts would contribute to fully accounting for
development’s long-standing contributions to vulnerability
and resilience studies. Multiple theoretical and practical
difficulties emerge when broader temporal and spatial
perspectives and contexts are not considered, as shown by
examining the suggestion of ‘‘double exposure.’’
‘‘Double exposure’’ describes how vulnerability is aug-
mented by having to deal simultaneously with problems
from the impacts of global environmental change and
economic globalization (Leichenko and O’Brien 2008).
The history of and literature from vulnerability and re-
silience research and on-the-ground practice, from the
1970s to today, has highlighted ‘‘multiple exposure’’
(Glantz 1977; Cuny 1983; Hewitt 1983; Lewis 1999;
Bankoff 2003; Wisner et al. 2004; Shaw et al. 2010a).
Climate change, globalization, poverty, earthquakes, in-
justice, tropical cyclones, lack of livelihood opportunities,
inequity, landslides, overexploitation of natural resources,
epidemics, and lack of water supply—amongst many other
ongoing challenges—often converge to most affect those
who have the fewest options and resources for dealing with
those challenges.
Consequently, those with the fewest options and re-
sources tend to be most vulnerable across all forms of
threats, demonstrating multiple exposure to multiple threats
simultaneously. To refer to ‘‘double exposure’’ by assuming
that only two forms of threat are especially important does
not factor in the more expansive forms of the notion that
have been long established in the literature. Leichenko and
O’Brien (2008, p. 31) mention ‘‘multiple stressors’’, but do
not reference the multiple exposure approaches of prior
literature and they nonetheless continue to focus on global
environmental change and economic globalization as being
the most important factors for their analyses. Is this simply a
theoretical dispute without much practical meaning?
The practical problem arises from the fact that, in many
locations, the most prominent or fundamental development
challenges are neither climate change nor globalization.
Decision-makers might be distracted by double exposure
and forget about, or wish to ignore, the 20 % HIV infection
rate or the upslope deforestation destroying the delta. That
does not deny potential globalization inputs into these
phenomena, but accepts that multi-scalar processes across
time and space are influential. Elsewhere, double exposure
Int J Disaster Risk Sci 23
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is more sinister. Exacerbated sea flooding in certain places
in Bangladesh was blamed on climate change whereas it
was actually due more to using structural sea defences
(Auerbach et al. 2015). Villagers in Vanuatu were termed
‘‘climate change refugees’’ even though the increased sea
flooding was due more to tectonic subsidence than to sea-
level rise (Ballu et al. 2011).
Research in Maldives (Kothari 2014) shows how cli-
mate change and globalization are being used as excuses by
the government to force a policy of population consolida-
tion (resettlement) on outer islanders. Yet the government
has long been trying to resettle the outer islanders closer to
the capital using other reasons, such as that it is hard to
provide a scattered population with services including
health, harbors, and education. Both arguments have le-
gitimacy and can be countered, but climate change is used
as an excuse to do what the government wishes to do
anyway. ‘‘Double exposure’’ can be used insidiously to
achieve hidden agendas by obscuring the full picture of
multiple exposure.
3 The Role of Climate Change
Yet misuse of climate change does not obviate climate
change as a significant concern that will cause major
problems, not just for low-lying islands such as Maldives
and low-lying coasts such as Bangladesh, but for all of
humanity (IPCC 2013–2014). Many good practice exam-
ples of resilience exist, to climate change impacts and to
other hazard drivers and hazards. These practices demon-
strate what can be achieved when broader concepts of
vulnerability and resilience are accepted and applied
(Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for
Disaster Reduction 2009, 2011). An ongoing challenge is
framing climate change in research, policy, and practice to
try to avoid the difficulties resulting from narrow views of
vulnerability and resilience or too much focus on a single
phenomenon such as climate change.
It is not appropriate to disparage or to ignore climate
change. Nor should a false duality be created by suggesting
that the debate is climate change versus other concerns
such as earthquakes, injustice, HIV/AIDS, gender equity,
or water resources. Care is nonetheless needed when
highlighting climate change, since addressing climate
change has the potential to create or exacerbate other de-
velopment concerns.
For example, large hydroelectric dams might contribute
to climate change mitigation through reduced dependence
on fossil fuels. Large dams might also contribute to climate
change adaptation by permitting a more stable water sup-
ply, irrespective of precipitation variations. But large dams
tend to increase flood risk over the long-term in a process
termed ‘‘risk transference’’ (Etkin 1999). Structural de-
fences including large dams stop smaller floods and permit
people to live in floodplains while remaining relatively dry.
As a result of this false sense of security, vulnerability to
flooding increases (Fordham 1999). Most structural de-
fences could fail at some point, often from an event that
exceeds or has different characteristics from the design
flood but sometimes because maintenance requirements
have not been met. Then the damage incurred by the flood
is much greater than it would have been without the false
sense of security imposed by the structural defences. Short-
term flood risk has decreased, but long-term flood risk has
increased. Risk is transferred into the future and aug-
mented, hence the term ‘‘risk transference’’ (Etkin 1999).
Risk can also be transferred amongst locations, sub-
populations, and sectors (Graham and Weiner 1995), which
makes it important to consider a multitude of challenges
(similarly to ‘‘multiple exposure’’) when assessing and
addressing vulnerability and resilience. Other than risk
transference, many other development concerns have also
been identified through relying on large dams (World
Commission on Dams 2000) irrespective of their potential
contributions to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Rather than keeping climate change as a separate or
dominating topic, the proposal from a development per-
spective is to enact the ‘‘multiple exposure’’ perspective by
viewing climate change as one challenge amongst many
(Gaillard 2010; Mercer 2010). Researchers and practi-
tioners have long published on and tried to address vul-
nerability and resilience to the consequences of change,
positive and negative, at all time and space scales and
based on many forms of change (Glantz 1977; Lewis 1979,
1999; Hewitt 1983; Aysan and Davis 1992; Etkin 1999;
Bankoff 2001; Wisner et al. 2004, 2012). Examples are
aridification and desertification, climatic changes from
meteorite strikes and volcanic eruptions, local water
drawdown, and availability and use of local and locally
appropriate building materials. Contemporary climate
change is one more to add to this well-established list—and
it should be added to ensure that climate change vul-
nerability and resilience are addressed. Nonetheless, cli-
mate change should not be tackled at the expense of other
challenges and opportunities in everyday life.
The subset within development work that is best suited
for placing climate change adaptation in perspective and
context is disaster risk reduction (Shaw et al. 2010a,
2010b). That arises due to the long history within disaster
risk reduction of dealing with climate-related changes at all
time and space scales and from multiple causes (Glantz
1977; Hewitt 1983; Lewis 1999; Garcia-Acosta 2004;
Wisner et al. 2004, 2012). Therefore, research, policy, and
practice should accept contemporary climate change as one
challenge amongst many within disaster risk reduction.
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Climate change as a subset within disaster risk reduction
can be elaborated through three main points.
First, climate change is one contributor to disaster risk
amongst many. Climate change should not be ignored but
neither does it necessarily dominate other contributors.
Those contributors include, but are not limited to, non-
climate-related environmental phenomena (for example,
earthquakes and volcanoes), inequities, injustices, social
oppression, discrimination, poor wealth distribution, and a
value system that permits exploitation of environmental
resources irrespective of the long-term consequences. Cli-
mate change drives both hazards and vulnerabilities.
It drives hazards, for instance, in that a hotter atmo-
sphere can hold more water vapor leading to increased
precipitation. When and where that moisture is released
can augment the intensities of floods and blizzards as they
occur. Sometimes climate change drives hazards by mak-
ing the hazards less extreme such as by reducing the fre-
quencies of Arctic storms called polar lows (Zahn and von
Storch 2010), Atlantic hurricanes (Knutson et al. 2010),
and winter floods in central Europe (Mudelsee et al. 2003).
Climate change drives vulnerabilities by changing local
environmental conditions so rapidly that local environ-
mental knowledge cannot keep pace with and is less ap-
plicable to, for example, local food resources. Whether
climate change is a more significant or a less significant
contributor than other factors—such as relying on struc-
tural approaches for floods or increasing the social op-
pression that creates and perpetuates food-related
vulnerabilities—depends on the specific context.
Second, climate change is one ‘‘creeping environmental
change’’ amongst many. Creeping environmental changes
are incremental changes in conditions that cumulate to
create a major problem, apparent or recognized only after a
threshold has been crossed (Glantz 1994a, 1994b). Climate
change fulfils that definition. Other creeping environmental
changes not linked to contemporary anthropogenic climate
change include soil erosion due to intensive farming,
salinization of freshwater supplies due to excessive draw-
down, and slow subsidence of land due to water or fossil
fuel pumping (Glantz 1994a, 1994b; Wisner et al. 2012).
Development work has long dealt with such topics (such as
the historical descriptions provided by Crush 1995; Glantz
1999; Gaillard 2010; Mercer 2010) and climate change can
readily be integrated into this set of development concerns.
Third, the reality is that climate change has become
politically important, within and outside of development.
That should provide an opportunity, not to focus exclu-
sively on climate change, but rather to raise the points
made in this article in order to engage interest in more
comprehensive development processes. Little point exists
in building a new school with natural ventilation tech-
niques that save energy and that cope with higher average
temperatures, if that school will collapse in the next
moderate, shallow earthquake. Similarly, if a hospital is
renovated with water-resistant materials and finishes for
climate change adaptation due to the projected expansion
of the floodplain, but is put out of action by toxic con-
taminants in the floodwater, then little has been achieved.
Climate change is one topic amongst many and should
be dealt with in wider contexts. Since climate change
drives hazards and vulnerabilities and since disaster risk
reduction efforts provide more comprehensive views of
vulnerability and resilience, a prudent place for climate
change would be placement within disaster risk reduction.
Climate change adaptation therefore becomes one of many
processes within disaster risk reduction.
4 Moving Beyond Climate Change, Vulnerability,
and Resilience
By placing climate change within disaster risk reduction,
while using the prominence of climate change to promote
and achieve wider development agendas, a long-term per-
spective is supported in which related research better
serves policy and practice—and vice versa. The long-term
perspective further assists in addressing the vulnerability
process and the resilience process. An historical perspec-
tive avoids being distracted by a myopic concentration on
climate change, instead directing attention to root causes
and the fundamentals of vulnerability and resilience as
long-term processes. Research, policy, and practice would
move forward in concert by accepting the widespread,
long-term causes and consequences of vulnerability and
resilience from multiple sources and requiring multiple,
integrated interventions.
Achieving this theoretical approach in practice would
set aside and move beyond vocabulary differences, instead
bringing together the 2015 processes under the common
banner of sustainability. Oliver-Smith (1979) referred to a
400-year earthquake in examining the 31 May 1970
earthquake and rock avalanche in Yungay, Peru that killed
thousands of the city’s inhabitants. The ‘‘400 year’’ time-
frame is not the geological return period of the seismic or
avalanche event. Instead, it refers to the fact that the root
causes of the vulnerability, which were exposed as a result
of the event, took 400 years to build up—a long-term
process. The vulnerability that caused the disaster can be
traced back to the Spanish conquest of the region, in terms
of demographics, settlement locations, and ways of liv-
ing—exactly the aspects that the Sustainable Development
Goals aim to address. No longer must ways of living and
livelihoods be categorized as vulnerability and/or re-
silience, but instead they are accepted as supporting mul-
tiple sustainability goals, tackling multiple exposure.
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Expanding the school and hospital examples at the end
of the previous section, disaster risk reduction is not the
ultimate endeavour. A school that withstands multiple
hazards might not achieve development and sustainability
goals if only boys are permitted to attend. A hospital built
with all disaster risk reduction considerations, including
with climate change adaptation factored in, but serving
only the most affluent people, sets back development by
expanding the rich-poor gap.
Consequently, although the role of climate change is to
be positioned within disaster risk reduction, disaster risk
reduction’s future is to be a subset of wider development
and sustainability processes. Having three separate streams
for international negotiations duplicates efforts and dis-
perses energy. But given this situation, bringing them all
together would be challenging; for instance, the climate
change negotiations seek a legally binding accord ratified
by world parliaments while the disaster risk reduction
process and the Sustainable Development Goals aim for
voluntary agreements. None of the three has yet articulated
a verifiable monitoring and enforcement mechanism,
although that could potentially develop. With effort and
will, these practical difficulties could be overcome,
although territorialism and vested interests are likely to
preclude such action.
The theoretical strength of climate change sitting within
disaster risk reduction, which in turn sits within develop-
ment and sustainability, can lead to positive policy and
practice outcomes. This approach would represent a vision
for disaster risk reduction’s future, ending tribalism and
separation in order to work together to achieve common
goals. Although the prospect of this integrated approach
occurring seems unlikely, not despite but because of the
three 2015 processes and their long histories, the momen-
tum of three independent but overlapping institutional
paths should not stop us from doing our best to bring all
areas together in order to save humanity from itself.
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